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Abstract
We examine optimal auction design when buyers may receive future outside offers. The
winning bidder may choose to default upon observing her outside offer. Under the optimal
mechanism, the bidder with the highest value wins if and only if her value is above a cutoff,
and the winner never defaults. The optimal auction takes the form of a second-price auction
with a reserve price and a deposit by the winning bidder. Under regularity conditions, both the
optimal reserve price and the deposit increase when the distribution of outside offers worsens.
Keywords: Truthful direct mechanism; full compliance; outside offers; deposit requirements;
reserve prices.
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1 Introduction
It often takes time for the winning buyer and the seller to complete the transaction with high-
value auction items after the auction concludes. During this time, the winner may receive an
alternative outside offer and renege on the original transaction if the outside offer is better.1 In
such a situation, it is a common practice for the seller to demand a non-refundable deposit from
the winning bidder before settling the final transaction. If the winner defaults on the transaction,
the deposit is forfeited. Deposit requirements (normally capped at a certain amount) have been
widely adopted by sellers in practice. For instance, sellers in eBay auto auctions are allowed to set
a deposit that is no more than 2, 000 US dollars. After paying the deposit, the winners can make
final payments within a week or ten days. In UK real estate auctions, a buyer is required to pay
a deposit of 6, 000 UK pounds immediately after winning; the buyer then has to make the final
payment within twenty eight days.
It is, therefore, worthwhile to examine the impact of a deposit requirement on bidding strategy
and the seller’s revenue in the auction. A deposit has a direct effect that compensates the seller
by making post-auction default costly. However, there is an indirect effect, as bidders who account
for a possible future default will adjust their bids in response to the deposit requirement. It is not
clear whether the seller benefits from requiring a deposit, and if so, at what level the deposit should
be set. In addition, a large body of literature following Myerson (1981) has shown that a reserve
price helps screen out low-value bidders and improve seller revenue. We explore the different roles
of, and the links between the reserve price and the deposit requirement.
Our investigation starts by examining a class of truthful direct mechanisms, which can be
described as follows: A seller would like to maximize revenue by allocating a single object among
some bidders. Each bidder’s private value is independently drawn from a common distribution.
In the first stage, bidders report their values, and at most, one winner is selected to enter the
second stage. All bidders discover their random outside offers in the second stage. In the second
stage, the chosen winner reports her outside price, and the mechanism decides whether the winner
completes the transaction or takes the outside offer. Relying on the necessary condition for first-
stage incentive compatibility, we establish an upper bound for seller revenue under this class of
mechanisms. Moreover, the upper bound of revenue entails the following allocation rules: In the
1A typical example is online auction marketplaces, i.e., eBay, where auctions are listed regularly and sequentially,
and it is easy for buyers to conduct post-auction searches for better outside offers before the final transaction. In
this case, sellers are faced with buyers’ commitment issues. Resnick and Zeckhauser (2002) observe that the most
common complaint by sellers in online auctions is that winning bidders do not follow through with the transactions.
Dellarocas and Wood (2008) find that 81 percent of the negative feedback given to buyers in eBay auctions results
from “bidders who backed out of their commitment to buy the items they won.”
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first stage, a bidder with the highest value is selected as the winner if and only if her private value
is no less than a cutoff value, and in the second stage, the winner never defaults.
We next examine whether and how the upper bound of the seller’s revenue can be achieved
through a second-price auction with a winner-pay deposit and a reserve price. A winner-pay
deposit increases default cost and therefore lowers the winner’s incentive to exercise the outside
offer. In the auction, the seller first announces the deposit and the reserve price. All bidders place
their bids simultaneously, and the bidder with the highest bid wins (given that her bid is no less
than the reserve price). The winning bidder then decides whether to pay the deposit before the
random price of the outside offer is realized.2 After the deposit is paid, the winning bidder can
either complete the original transaction or take the outside offer and forfeit the deposit.3 If the
deposit is not paid, the winner only decides whether to take the outside offer. When the winner
defaults on the original transaction after paying the deposit, she loses the deposit, and the seller
keeps the object.
To better understand the impact of the deposit and the reserve price on equilibrium bidding
strategies and seller revenue, we first study the optimal reserve price for each level of deposit
and then examine the overall effect of a change in the deposit (with the optimal reserve price as
a function of the deposit). We find that seller revenue strictly increases with the deposit until
a specific cutoff value and then becomes flat. Maximal seller revenue, which equals the upper
bound of revenue identified above, is achieved when the deposit is set sufficiently high such that
the winner is deterred from defaulting. This result, in turn, indicates that a second-price auction
with the identified deposit and reserve price is essentially the optimal design among the class of
mechanisms considered.
The intuition of our result is as follows: bidders lower their bids when facing a higher deposit
requirement in the auction. But setting a reserve price as the minimum bid excludes low-value
bidders, which helps offset the negative effect of the deposit on seller revenue. Thus, it turns out
that an auction with relatively low bids and full compliance is more profitable than one with high
bids but partial compliance. Consequently, the seller raises the required deposit until the possibility
of ex-post default decreases to zero.
To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first to examine the impact of deposit requirements
on bidding strategies and seller revenue. Our paper is related to the literatures on auctions without
buyer commitment and auctions with outside options, which we now review.
Auctions without buyer commitment. First, our paper is related to the growing literature on
2In the auction, the price of the outside offer can be private information for the winning bidder.
3In our model, we assume that if the final price is less than the deposit, the seller commits to pay back the
difference when the winner chooses to complete the transaction.
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auctions without buyer commitment. Asker (2000) studies an auction model in which bidders face
uncertainty regarding their final valuations of the object, and this uncertainty can only be resolved
after bidding has taken place. He shows that the inclusion of a withdrawal right (allowing the winner
to default) raises the seller’s expected revenue. Zheng (2001, 2009) considers the situation where
bidders facing budget constraints can default on their bids. He shows that the default risk induced
by financial constraints affects both equilibrium bidding strategies and seller revenues in auctions.
Engelmann, Frank, Koch, and Valente (2015) study an auction model in which the seller can
make a second-chance offer to the second-highest bidder if the auction winner fails to complete the
transaction. Their analysis shows that the availability of such an offer reduces bidders’ willingness
to bid in the auction, thus lowering the seller’s revenue, even when no default takes place.
Krähmer and Strausz (2015) investigate the effects of the withdrawal right on optimal sales
contracts that involve only one buyer and one seller. In their contracting environment, the buyer,
after having observed her private valuation, has the choice of either exercising her option as specified
in the contract or withdrawing from it and choosing her outside option. Their findings show
that the inclusion of default rights is equivalent to introducing ex-post participation constraints
in the sequential screening model; even though sequential screening is still feasible with ex-post
participation constraints, the seller no longer benefits from it. Instead, the optimal selling contract
is static and coincides with the optimal posted price contract in the static screening model.4
Our study is closely related to that of Armstrong and Zhou (2016), who study optimal search
deterrence in a one-seller-and-one-buyer setting. In their model, the buyer incurs a cost to search
for an outside option. They primarily focus on the seller’s choice between a buy-it-now discount
offer and an exploding offer and study the optimal selling mechanism. Their analysis reveals that,
at the optimum, the seller might charge a non-refundable deposit. Our paper is also linked to the
literature on auction design with an optimal search.5 One of the most important findings is from
Crémer, Spiegel, and Zheng (2007, 2009), who consider the optimal auction design when the seller
controls the set of participating bidders. They show that the optimal selling mechanism would
feature fewer participants and more extended searches. Moreover, their papers assume the winner
cannot recall the original transaction. On the contrary, our paper considers the case in which the
winner can hold the object by paying the deposit and then compare it with the outside offer.
Although our study and the literature on auctions without buyer commitment share a common
feature that the auction winner may renege on the original transaction, the focus of our paper
differs. We provide a rationale for the seller’s adoption of a deposit, which is commonly observed
4For example, see related studies by Ben-Shahar and Posner (2011) and Eidenmüller (2011).
5For example, see related studies from McAfee and McMillan (1988); Burguet (1996); Lee and Li (2020).
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in real-world auctions, and characterize how the seller should set both the deposit and the reserve
price in the auction.
Auctions with outside options. Our paper is also part of the literature on auctions with outside
options. Cherry, Frykblom, Shogren, List, and Sullivan (2004) conduct a lab experiment to examine
whether bidders consider the existence of outside options when formulating their bidding strategies
in second-price auctions. Their results show that bidders reduce their bids whenever their resale
values exceed the price of the outside option. Kirchkamp, Poen, and Reiss (2009) study the equi-
librium bidding behavior of bidders in first-price and second-price auctions with outside options.
They show that first-price auctions yield more revenue to sellers than second-price auctions, which
may explain why first-price auctions are more common in practice.
Lauermann and Virág (2012) study how the presence of outside options influences whether an
auctioneer prefers “opaque” or “transparent” auctions, which differ based on the information that
bidders receive. They show that an auctioneer might choose opaque auctions to reduce the values
of the bidders’ outside options. Figueroa and Skreta (2007, 2009) examine revenue-maximizing
auctions for multiple objects, where bidders’ outside options depend on their private information
and are endogenously chosen by the seller. They show that an optimal mechanism may or may not
allocate the objects efficiently.
The existing models consider either only losing bidders having ex-post outside options or all
bidders knowing their outside options before bidding. We instead consider a scenario where outside
offers arrive after all bidders have submitted their bids, and they are available to all bidders,
including the auction winner (i.e., the winner can choose to either complete the original transaction
or default and take the outside offer). In addition, our analysis focuses on the role of a deposit
requirement in such an environment.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the model setup and
analyze the upper bound on seller revenue. Section 3 examines how a second-price auction with a
deposit and a reserve price can achieve the revenue upper bound. Section 4 discusses distributions
of the outside offers and the robustness of our results when relaxing some assumptions. Section
5 concludes the paper. The proofs of our main results are in the Appendix, and all the other
non-essential proofs and computational details are included in Appendices S1 and S2, which are
for online publication.
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2 The Model and Analysis of General Mechanism
There are N potential risk-neutral bidders, where 1 < N <∞, who compete for an indivisible
object. The seller’s reservation value of the object is normalized to be zero. Bidders’ private values,
denoted by vi, i = 1, 2, ..., N , are independent draws from a common atomless distribution F (·)
with density f(·) > 0 over the support of [0, v̄], where v > 0. After the competition, each bidder
i receives her own outside offer, which gives the same object (thus the same value vi) but with a
random price, denoted by pi. Prices pi, i = 1, 2, ..., N , are random draws from a common atomless
distribution Φ(·) with density ϕ(·) > 0 over [0, v̄]. Bidder i’s vi and pi are independent and private
information. We assume that F and Φ are common knowledge among the seller and bidders, and
they are regular in the sense that the hazard rates f(·)1−F (·) and
ϕ(·)
1−Φ(·) are increasing.
Instead of studying a specific auction format, we start by examining a class of direct mechanisms
with two stages of bidder value reporting and arrival of future outside offers. As mentioned above,
the purpose of doing this is to understand how to design the winner selection and the default
deterrence, and more importantly, it allows us to explore the upper bound of seller revenue. In
Section 3, we will show that the upper bound is indeed achievable by a second-price auction with
properly set reserve price and winner-pay deposit. In this sense, focusing on the second-price
auction has no loss of generality.
The class of direct mechanisms we consider can be described as follows: In the first stage,




N ) to denote the bidders’
reports. Among those bidders, at most one winner is selected to participate in the second stage.
The probability that bidder i is selected is denoted by q1i (v





′) ≤ 1 and bidder
i’s payment to the seller in the first stage is denoted by m1i (v
′) ∈ [0,+∞).
In the second stage, the selected bidder observes the price pi of her outside offer and makes a
report, denoted by p′i ∈ [0, v̄]. The object is sold to the selected bidder if and only if p′i ≥ p̂i(v′) ∈
[0, v̄], and the associated payment to the seller in the second stage is denoted by m2i (v
′, p′i) ∈
[0,+∞). If p′i < p̂i(v′), the current transaction is not completed and the selected bidder takes the
















 1 if p
′
i ≥ p̂i(v′);
0 if p′i < p̂i(v
′).
(1)
6In fact, whether the object will be allocated to the selected bidder i in the second stage does not depend on other
losing bidders’ reports in the first stage, thereby implying that making the deposit a function of all the losing bids in
the auction is unlikely to improve the seller’s revenue.
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We here look for the optimal truthful direct mechanism that maximizes the seller’s expected rev-
enue. In this design problem, the seller’s choice variables are {q1i (v′),m1i (v′); p̂i(v′),m2i (v′, p′i); i =
1, 2, ...N}. Since we aim to establish an upper bound on seller revenue, in the following analysis,
we relax the design problem by assuming that pi in the second stage is public information. This
relaxation would weakly increase the seller’s revenue and moreover, by doing so, we can ignore
the individual rationality (IR) and incentive compatibility (IC) constraints in the second stage but
focus on the design problem in the first stage.
2.1 Implication of incentive compatibility in the first stage
Assuming that all other bidders tell the truth, let us now consider bidder i with value vi and










i, pi; p̂i)vi + (1− q2i (v′i, pi; p̂i)) max{vi − pi, 0} − m2i (v′i,v−i, pi)
]
+ (1− q1i (v′i,v−i)) max{vi − pi, 0} −m1i (v′i,v−i)
 .
(2)
where the first term in the curly brackets is the expected payoff from being selected to enter the
second stage (with probability of q1i (v
′
i,v−i)) and the second term in the curly brackets is the
expected payoff from not being selected to enter but facing the outside offer (with probability of
1− q1i (v′i,v−i)).
To guarantee that no one has any incentive to lie about her value, incentive compatibility (IC)
requires that, for all i, for all vi and v
′
i,
πi(vi, vi) ≥ πi(v′i, vi),
indicating that any untruthful reporting cannot be beneficial for the bidder in the mechanism.
When bidder i with private value vi chooses not to make a report (or always report zero) in the
first stage but faces the outside offer directly, her expected payoff from the outside offer is given
by
∫ vi
0 (vi−pi)ϕ(pi)dpi, which can be simplified as
∫ vi
0 Φ(pi)dpi. Individual rationality (IR) requires






In particular, a bidder with value 0 will get zero payoff from her outside offer, i.e., we must have
π(0, 0) ≥ 0 from IR.
We then have the following lemma (See Appendix for the proof).
Lemma 1. If the mechanism is incentive compatible, then bidder i’s expected payoff can be expressed
as follows:7






q2i (t, pi; p̂i) + (1− q2i (t, pi; p̂i))1{t− pi ≥ 0}
]
+ (1− q1i (t,v−i))1{t− pi ≥ 0}
 dt.
(3)
2.2 An upper bound on seller revenue and full deterrence
Define virtual value as follows:
λ(vi, pi) =
 pi if pi ≤ vi;
J(vi) if pi > vi.
(4)
where J(vi) ≡ vi − 1−F (vi)f(vi) . Let us denote the seller’s revenue function by R and given Lemma 1,
we can then establish the following lemma (See Appendix for the proof).

















q2i (vi, pi; p̂i)λ(vi, pi)
}
. (5)
Now we are ready to establish an upper bound for seller revenue and characterize features of












Let us further use v(1) ≡ max{vi, i = 1, 2, ..., N} to denote the highest value among bidders and set
7This lemma can also be obtained by appealing to the version of the envelope theorem in Milgrom and Segal
(2002).
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the following allocation rules:
p̂soi (vi,v−i) =
 0 if vi ≥ v̌
so;
v̄ if vi < v̌
so,
and qsoi (vi,v−i) =
 1 if vi = v
(1) and vi ≥ v̌so;
0 otherwise.
(7)
In our analysis, v̌so is called the winning threshold, indicating that in the first stage, a bidder with
the highest value is selected as the winner if and only if her value is no less than the threshold v̌so.8
We therefore have q1i (v
′) = 0 and m1i (v
′) = 0 if v′i < v̌
so. We then have the following result (See
Appendix for the proof).
















where Q(·) ≡ FN−1(·).
Our characterization above shows that to achieve the upper bound of revenue R∗, the seller
needs to screen out bidders using threshold v̌so in the first stage and then induce full compliance,
i.e., p̂so = 0, in the second stage. The winning bidder i’s virtual value is pi if pi is lower than value
vi, and the virtual value is J(vi) = vi − 1−F (vi)f(vi) when pi ≥ vi. The seller sets a cutoff price p̂i to
maximize the expected virtual values, subject to the constraint that the winning bidder defaults
if and only if the outside price is lower than threshold p̂i. Note that the virtual value function
as a function of pi starts from 0 and increases until pi = vi, and then it drops to a flat level of
J(vi). Therefore, the seller must set p̂i to either 0 or v depending on the level of J(vi). Since J(vi)
increases with vi, for vi ≥ v̌so, the seller finds it optimal to set p̂i to 0; and, for vi < v̌so, it is
optimal to set p̂i to v. Note that, given that pi is assumed to be known publicly, the identified
maximum of seller revenue gives the upper bound the seller can achieve. In the next section, we
will show that a second-price auction with properly designed deposits and reserve prices can still
achieve the upper bound, even when pi is private information.
3 Implementation by SPA with Deposit and Reserve Price
In this section, we consider a second-price auction game with deposit D and reserve price r.9
Note that charging a deposit increases the default cost of the winning bidder and therefore, it affects
8In Proof of Proposition 1, we will provide the derivation of the threshold v̌so.
9See the formal setup and timing of the auction game and characterizations of bidder strategies in online Appendix
S1.
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the cutoff p̂i of whether to take the outside offer or complete the original transaction. Specifically,
the auction game includes three stages: In stage t = 0, the seller sets up the deposit and reserve
price. In stage t = 1, all the bidders submit simultaneous bids. Only those bids which are no less
than the reserve price r are valid. In stage t = 2, the winning bidder decides whether to pay the
deposit. In stage t = 3, an outside offer with price pi arrives (which is the winning bidder’s private
information) and then the winner decides whether to default and take the outside offer or complete
the current transaction, conditional on paying the deposit D.
Given the auction setup, the characterizations of bidder i’s decisions on paying the deposit at
t = 2 and taking the outside offer at t = 3 are straightforward. If the bidder does not win the
auction, whether to pay the deposit becomes irrelevant and the only option she faces is the outside
offer: taking the offer if vi ≥ pi; otherwise, not to make the purchase. Conditional on winning,
bidder i along the equilibrium path pays the deposit and faces two options between the original
transaction and the outside offer:10 the bidder completes the original transaction if the price for the
outside offer is no less than the rest of the final payment; otherwise, the bidder takes the outside
offer. Based on the strategies at t = 2 and t = 3, we employ backward induction to derive a bidder’s
equilibrium bidding strategy b(vi). Given D and r from the seller, define two cutoff values v̌ ∈ [0, v̄]








Note that if b(v̄) ≤ r, we then have v̌ ≥ v̄, and no bidder participates. If b(v̄) ≤ D, we have v̂ ≥ v̄,
and no bidder will bid more than the deposit D.











Φ(pi)dpi if vi ∈ [v̌, v̂];
∅ if vi < v̌.
(9)
In Case (II) where r ≥ D, we have v̂ ≤ v̌; only the bidder with vi ∈ [v̌, v̄] will submit a valid
10If the winning bidder chooses not to pay the deposit, this is an off-equilibrium behavior, and the seller will
interpret the behavior as a default. Strategically, this off-equilibrium behavior is equivalent to the case where the
bidder chooses not to bid in the auction but waits for the outside offer directly.
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Φ(pi)dpi if vi ≥ v̌;
∅ if vi < v̌.
(10)
Now let us examine the seller’s optimal choices of reserve price r and deposit D at t = 0. We
denote the seller’s expected revenue by R(r,D), and the expected revenue-maximizing problem




Depending on r and D, the bidders’ equilibrium biding strategies are as characterized above. We












where the sub-problem maxr: r≤D R(r,D) corresponds to Case (I) where r ≤ D and the other sub-
problem maxr: r≥D R(r,D) corresponds to Case (II) where r ≥ D. In each case, the seller’s revenue
equals the auction price if the winner does not default, the deposit if the winner does, and zero in
the absence of any valid bids. For notation simplification, we write the seller’s expected revenue in
the former sub-problem as EIS [R(r,D)] and the latter as EIIS [R(r,D)] in the following analysis.
In Case (I) where r ≤ D, we write the bidding strategy in (9) as b(vi) and b̃(vi) for vi ∈ [v̌, v̂] and
vi ∈ (v̂, v̄], respectively. Then, the seller’s expected revenue EIS [R(r,D)] is given by the following
equation. According to Lemma 4 in online Appendix S1, v̌ is increasing in r but independent of D
and v̂ is increasing in D but independent of r in Case (I).



























where Q(·) ≡ FN−1(·). The first term occurs when only the highest value of all bidders is above
v̌. The second term occurs when the highest and the second-highest values are between v̌ and v̂.
The third term occurs when the highest value is higher than v̂ while the second-highest value is
between v̌ and v̂. The last term occurs when both the highest and the second-highest values are
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above v̂.
In Case (II) where r ≥ D, the bidding strategy b(vi) is given by (10), and the seller’s expected
revenue EIIS [R(r,D)] is given by the following equation. According to Lemma 4 in online Appendix
S1, v̌ is increasing in both r and D in Case (II).






















where the first term occurs when only the highest value of all bidders is above v̌, while the second
term occurs when both the highest and the second-highest values are above v̌.
Our analysis will be carried out using the following two steps to examine the seller’s problem
with the instruments (r,D). Step one: for each given deposit level, we pin down the optimal
reserve price. For this purpose, we analyze the seller’s revenue maximization problems separately
in Case (I) where r ≤ D and Case (II) where r ≥ D. Let us denote the overall maximized expected
seller revenue by R∗(D) and the seller’s optimal choice regarding the reserve price by r∗(D). Then,



















The characterization of r∗(D) helps us identify the connection between the deposit and the optimal
reserve price, which shows us how to set the reserve price optimally for any given deposit. Step two:
we relax the condition so the seller is free to choose any level of deposit and examine the optimal
deposit that maximizes R∗(D) with the optimal reserve price r∗(D), that is, maxD∈[0,v̄]R
∗(D). By
doing so, we obtain the optimal deposit and the associated reserve price.
Following the steps mentioned above, we first separately characterize the seller’s optimal choice
of the reserve price for a given deposit under Case (I) and Case (II). Before proceeding further, we





where v̂so = v. Recall that v̌so and rso are defined in (6). We then have b(v̂so) = Dso and
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b(v̌so) = rso. Clearly, Dso is strictly greater than rso.
We then establish Lemmas 5 – 8 to help us characterize the seller’s optimal choice of the reserve
price r, given that D is set in the intervals of [0, rso), [rso, Dso], and (Dso, v̄], respectively. Since
these lemmas are rather technical, we instead put all the technical proofs for the seller’s choice on
reserve price for any given deposit in online Appendix S1. Let rI(D) and rII(D) denote the optimal
reserve price maximizing EIS [R(r,D)] under Case (I) where r ≤ D and maximizing EIIS [R(r,D)] in
Case II where r ≥ D, respectively. After obtaining the solutions for the sub-problems separately, we
then compare the maximized seller revenues EIS [R(rI(D), D)] and EIIS [R(rII(D), D)] across Cases
(I) and (II) for a given D ∈ [0, Dso]. Note that with D = r at the 45-degree line, v̌ = v̂, and revenue
functions in both cases are the same, i.e., EIS [R(rI(D), D)] = EIIS [R(rII(D), D)]. By doing so, we
can establish the following result (See Appendix for the proof).
Proposition 2. The optimal reserve price r∗(D) can be characterized as follows:
r∗(D) =
 r
I(D) if D ∈ [rso, Dso];
rII(D) if D ∈ [0, rso).
(15)
From Proposition 2, it is easy to see that r∗(D) = rso ≤ D when D ∈ [rso, Dso] and r∗(D) ≥ D
when D ∈ [0, rso).11 In practice, due to (a) the time and/or budget constraints faced by the
buyers (bidders), especially for the items with high values, and/or (b) regulations from the market
regulators, like those real examples mentioned in the introduction, often an upper limit on the
deposit that the seller can charge in the auction is imposed. Our result demonstrates how to set
the corresponding optimal reserve price for a given deposit level. Let D̄ ∈ [0, Dso) denote the upper
limit on the deposit, and then the reserve price is given by r∗(D̄), as shown in Proposition 2. In
this case, the cutoff v̂ is lower than v̄, and the possibility of default from the winner is not fully
deterred.





∗(D), D)] if D ∈ [rso, Dso];
EIIS [R(r∗(D), D)] if D ∈ [0, rso).
(16)
11To provide some insights on the seller’s choices of reserve price r and deposit D, we present numerical example 1
in online Appendix S2. Assume for simplicity that there are only two bidders (N = 2) and that both bidder valuations
and outside offers are uniformly distributed on the unit interval (vi ∼ U [0, 1] and pi ∼ U [0, 1]). Our computations
show rso = 0.33333 and Dso = 0.5. Note that if no post-auction outside offer exists, i.e., Φ(·) = 0, the optimal reserve
price is 0.5. Moreover, when the seller sets r ≥ 0.5, no valid bids will be submitted, and the seller’s revenue decreases
to zero. All details regarding the computations are in online Appendix S2.
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Using (16), we move to step two to examine the optimal deposit and the associated reserve price.
Suppose that the seller is free to set the level of the deposit in the auction; the following result can
then be established (see Appendix for the proof).
Proposition 3. dR
∗(D)
dD ≥ 0 for any D ∈ [0, D
so]. In particular, dR
∗(D)
dD = 0 when D = D
so. As
a result, the combination of Dso and rso defined in ( 14) and ( 6) maximizes the seller’s overall
expected revenue.
Proposition 3 describes how the overall seller revenue changes with the deposit requirement. A
higher deposit requirement induces a higher overall expected revenue to the seller. The maximum
is achieved at D = Dso, and the associated optimal reserve price is given by rso. Then, R∗(Dso) is
given by the following equation:



























Given that v̂so = v̄ and b(x) =
∫ x
0 (1 − Φ(pi))dpi, the third and fourth terms become zero and the
second term can be re-written as
∫ v̄
v̌so(1 − F (x))b(x)dQ(x) by changing order of the integration.
























showing that R∗(Dso) is identical to R∗ in Proposition 1. Note that charging any deposit D > Dso
generates the same expected overall revenue as D = Dso to the seller. It is clear by (14) that,
at the optimum, D = Dso implies that the cutoff v̂so is equal to v̄; the default possibility for the
winning bidder is fully prevented, thereby resulting in full compliance in the auction, i.e., p̂so = 0.
The analysis here suggests that
Theorem 1. The second-price auction with Dso and rso generates the upper bound of seller revenue
R∗.
Setting a high deposit, on the one hand, makes winning become less attractive and in turn gives
bidders incentives to lower their bids in the auction; on the other hand, the deposit requirement
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increases the winner’s default cost, which reduces the likelihood that she will withdraw from the
original transaction. Our analysis indicates that the latter positive effect always dominates the
former negative effect; the seller’s revenue is maximized by setting a sufficiently high deposit to
fully deter the possibility of default. In this case, the reserve price also plays an important role
in excluding the possibility of selling the item to bidders with very low bids, thereby helping the
seller offset the negative effect of the deposit requirement and increase revenue. Figure 4 in online
Appendix S1 confirms that it is not optimal to use the deposit requirement alone; given any deposit
requirement D ∈ [0, Dso] in the auction, the overall seller revenue with a zero reserve price is strictly
less than that of r∗(D). However, if the reserve price is too high, it would (a) screen out bidders
with reasonably high values and (b) induce a high ending price, which gives a higher incentive to
the auction winner to default; both effects hurt the seller’s expected revenue and thus limit the
level of the reserve price the seller can set. As shown in Proposition 3, the optimal reserve price is
set at rso.
It is also of interest to compare the optimal reserve price rso to that of Myerson (1981). We
denote Myerson’s optimal reserve price by rm, which is given by 1−F (r
m)
f(rm) = r
m. From the charac-















Φ(pi)]dpi ≤ v̌so, we have rm ≥ v̌so ≥ rso. Clearly, rm = v̌so = rso if and only if there exists no
outside offer, i.e., Φ(·) = 0. Summarizing the comparison yields the following result.
Remark 1. rm ≥ v̌so ≥ rso. In particular, rm = v̌so = rso only when no outside offer exists, i.e.,
Φ(·) = 0.
4 Discussion
We now discuss different distributions of the distribution of the outside offers and the robustness
of our results when relaxing some important assumptions.12
12We also analyze the cases of percentage deposit and deposit proportionally deducted from full payment. See the
related discussion in online Appendix S1.
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4.1 Distribution of the outside offer
In this section, we study the impact of the outside offer in the auction. When the price of the
outside offer is equal to 0 with probability 1, bidders will not enter the auction but choose to wait
for the outside offer, regardless of r and D set by the seller. In this case, (14) implies that the
optimal deposit Dso is 0. Another extreme case is when no outside offer exists for bidders after
the auction, i.e., Φ(·) = 0. In this case, the bidding strategy and the seller revenue are the same
as those in the standard second-price auction (with Myerson’s reserve price). (14) states that the
optimal deposit Dso in this case is equal to v. It is clear in both cases that charging any deposit D
will not affect the seller’s revenue.
Next, we examine how different distributions of the outside offers affect the auction design.
Given r and D, let b(vi,Φ1) and b(vi,Φ2) denote the equilibrium bidding functions corresponding
to the distributions of the outside offer Φ1(·) and Φ2(·), respectively; and further denote the optimal
reserve price, the optimal deposit, and the overall seller revenue by rsok , D
so




respectively, corresponding to Φk(·), k = 1, 2. Our results are stated as follows (see Appendix for
the proof).13
Proposition 4. If the distribution of the outside offer worsens (in the sense of first-order stochastic
dominance) from the bidders’ perspective, i.e., Φ1(·) < Φ2(·),
(i) the equilibrium bid submitted by a bidder is higher for any given reserve price r and deposit
D, that is, v̌1 < v̌2, v̂1 < v̂2, and b(vi,Φ1) > b(vi,Φ2);
(ii) the seller sets a higher optimal deposit, that is, Dso1 > D
so
2 ;
(iii) the optimal seller revenue is higher, that is, R∗(rso1 , D
so




Part (i) of Proposition 4 is intuitive; when the possibility for an attractive outside offer is
smaller, the original auction becomes more attractive, which induces the bidders to submit higher
bids. Interestingly, part (ii) shows that a worse distribution for the outside offer allows the seller
to charge a higher deposit. This result can be explained as follows: A worse distribution induces
bidders to bid more aggressively, thereby increasing the probability of post-auction default by the
winner. As shown above, it is preferable for the seller to have full compliance in the auction,
although it would lower bids from the bidders. Therefore, to deter the winner from defaulting, a
13To further illustrate the impacts of the distribution of an outside offer, we present numerical example 2, assuming
that bidder i’s valuation still follows a uniform distribution, but the distribution of the outside offer takes the form
of Φ(pi) = p
α
i over [0, 1], where α ≥ 0. We then compute how a change in α affects the sellers’ choices regarding the
optimal reserve price rso, the optimal deposit Dso, and the optimal expected revenue R∗. The computational results
are consistent with the predictions in Proposition 4, and all the details are presented in online Appendix S2.
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higher deposit, combined with a higher reserve price (see Proposition 5), must be demanded in the
auction. As a result, a worse distribution leads to a higher revenue to the seller, which gives part
(iii).
We then turn to the comparisons of the threshold v̌so and the optimal reserve price rso. Define
function τ(vi) as τ(vi) ≡
∫ vi
0 [1−Φ(pi)]dpi
1−Φ(vi) . Differentiating τ(vi) with respect to vi yields














1−Φ2(·) , then τ1(·) < τ2(·).




















0 [1−Φ2(pi)]dpi = r
so
2 .
This gives us the following result.










1−Φ2(·) . The seller sets a higher opti-
mal reserve price when the distribution of the outside offer worsens (in the sense of hazard rate
dominance) from the bidders’ perspective.
4.2 Stochastic number of bidders
Rather than being fixed, the number of bidders may be stochastic. E.g., in internet auctions,
an entering bidder does not know the number of rival bidders, but only the distribution of the
number of potential bidders. One may then question whether the characterization of the optimal
auction design with r and D still holds. First, regardless of whether the participation process is
stochastic, conditional on winning, it is still optimal for bidder i to adopt the deposit strategy
and the outside offer strategy characterized in (A4) and (A1) in online Appendix S1. Second, the
equilibrium bidding strategy still follows the property of the second-price auction mechanism itself,
that is, a bidder’s bidding strategy does not depend on the number of entering bidders. Thus, if
bidders’ participation is stochastic, the combination of rso and Dso is still optimal. Note that the
optimal reserve price rso and deposit Dso do not depend on the number of bidders.
14This also implies that Φ1(·) first-order stochastically dominates Φ2(·), that is, Φ1(·) ≤ Φ2(·); see more details in
online Appendix B of Krishna (2002).
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4.3 English ascending auction format
It is natural to examine whether our result still holds in the English ascending auction format
instead of the simultaneous bidding format. We still solve the game by backward induction. Clearly,
the optimality of the deposit strategy and the outside offer strategy in (A4) and (A1), respectively,
will not change. The equilibrium bidding strategy we constructed is a weakly dominant strategy for
bidders (see details in online Appendix S1); in the bidding stage of the English ascending auction,
it cannot be optimal for the bidder to stay in after the current price exceeds the equilibrium bid
or drop out before the current price reaches the equilibrium bid. Thus, the combination of rso and
Dso is still optimal if the auction takes the English ascending format.
4.4 Deposit requirement before bidding
Our analysis in the main text focused on the winner-pay deposit. In practice, another type of
deposit exists where the seller requires all potential bidders to pay a certain amount as a deposit
before submitting bids. After the auction ends, the seller refunds the deposits to all the bidders,
except the winner. Then, the winner can choose to either default and lose the deposit or complete
the current transaction by paying the final auction price minus the deposit. Such a deposit require-
ment is commonly used in art or antiques auctions. For instance, Sotheby’s requires such a deposit
for items. We call it the all-pay deposit.
It is then interesting to examine whether these two types of deposit requirements would result
in different equilibrium strategies and seller revenues. Across the two deposit requirements, a
bidder’s strategy regarding the outside offer is the same conditional on winning, and the only
difference is the timing of paying the deposit. Although a bidder needs to pay the deposit before
bidding with the all-pay deposit requirement, this does not affect the expected surplus of the
bidder and the construction of the equilibrium bid since the deposit will be refunded conditional
on losing the auction. Thus, we can conclude that, in the auction game, the winner-pay deposit
is strategically equivalent to the all-pay deposit requirement. However, this equivalence relies on
the seller’s commitment to refund the deposits to the losing bidders being credible. This may not
always be true in reality; the seller’s historical reputation and commitment issue may break down
the equivalence.15
15In short, the ascending bidding procedure in Section 4.3 and the deposit requirement before bidding in Section
4.4 do not affect threshold v̌so and full compliance p̂so = 0 in the truthful direct mechanism. Therefore, it explains
why they render the same optimal auction design.
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5 Conclusion
In this paper, we study the role of a deposit requirement in auctions with future outside offers for
all bidders and possibly defaulting from the winner. To examine the design problem and identify
the upper bound on seller revenue, we start by examining a truthful direct mechanism, which
includes two stages of bidder value reporting and arrival of outside offers (public information).
Our characterization shows that it is optimal to set up threshold v̌so in the first stage and full
compliance p̂so = 0 in the second stage. We next examine a second-price auction with a deposit
and a reserve price, showing that the upper bound of revenue can be achieved when a sufficiently
high deposit is charged to deter the winner from default fully. At the same time, a lower optimal
reserve price (which is uniquely determined by v̌so) than that of Myerson (1981) is required. Our
study provides a rationale for the widely adopted deposit requirements in auctions where winner
default is a recognized concern.
The environment we consider in the current study rules out some possible situations.16 One
relevant situation is that a bidder’s private valuation may be positively or negatively correlated
with the price of her outside offer. A positive correlation means that a higher outside price is more
likely for a higher value. In this case, the auction winner who tends to value the object higher
than the losers is less likely to default, and one can expect that a deposit requirement would play
a less significant role helping the seller. When the correlation is negative, the winner tends to have
a better outside offer, which means that the deposit requirement can play a more effective role
in enhancing the seller’s expected revenue. It would also be interesting to consider and examine
the role of a deposit requirement in a common value or an affiliated private value setting. The
mechanism design literature typically assumes independent private information across players due
to the full surplus extraction result of Crémer and McLean (1988). With affiliated private values,
their insight still applies in principle. As a result, the seller’s revenue under the optimal mechanism
is unlikely to be achievable by a second-price auction with deposit and reserve price. Another
possible extension is to allow correlation in bidders’ outside offers, which could arise since some
common outside offers might be accessible to all of them. Our analysis should still apply, as bidders’
payoffs only depend on their own outside offers. Moreover, the bidders’ outside offers might also be
correlated to the sellers’ reservation values since the same market conditions can affect all of them.
Our insight should also be able to accommodate this feature. These extensions are left for future
research.
16We thank Robert Porter for raising this point.
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Appendix: Proofs
In the Appendix, we provide proofs of Lemmas 1 and 2, and Propositions 1, 2, 3, and 4.
Proof of Lemma 1


















+ (1− q2i (v′i, pi; p̂i))(max{v′i − pi, 0} −max{vi − pi, 0})
]
+ (1− q1i (v′i,v−i))(max{v′i − pi, 0} −max{vi − pi, 0})
 .
Therefore, for v′i < vi, πi(v
′
















+ (1− q2i (v′i, pi; p̂i))(max{v′i − pi, 0} −max{vi − pi, 0})
]
+ (1− q1i (v′i,v−i))(max{v′i − pi, 0} −max{vi − pi, 0})
 ,
which we can re-write as follows







i, pi; p̂i) + (1− q2i (v′i, pi; p̂i))(max{vi − pi, 0} −max{v′i − pi, 0})/(vi − v′i)
]
+ (1− q1i (v′i,v−i))(max{vi − pi, 0} −max{v′i − pi, 0})/(vi − v′i)
 .
(17)
Again, given (2), we can construct the following equation
πi(vi, vi) = πi(vi, v
′




q2i (vi, pi; p̂i)(vi − v′i)
+ (1− q2i (vi, pi; p̂i))(max{vi − pi, 0} −max{v′i − pi, 0})
]
+ (1− q1i (vi,v−i))(max{vi − pi, 0} −max{v′i − pi, 0})
 .
Therefore, for v′i < vi, πi(vi, v
′
i) ≤ πi(v′i, v′i) and that yields




q2i (vi, pi; p̂i)(vi − v′i)
+ (1− q2i (vi, pi; p̂i))(max{vi − pi, 0} −max{v′i − pi, 0})
]
+ (1− q1i (vi,v−i))(max{vi − pi, 0} −max{v′i − pi, 0})
 ,
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which we can re-write as follows





q2i (vi, pi; p̂i) + (1− q2i (vi, pi; p̂i))(max{vi − pi, 0} −max{v′i − pi, 0})/(vi − v′i)
]
+ (1− q1i (vi,v−i))(max{vi − pi, 0} −max{v′i − pi, 0})/(vi − v′i)
 .
(18)







q2i (vi, pi; p̂i) + (1− q2i (vi, pi; p̂i))1{vi − pi ≥ 0}
]
+ (1− q1i (vi,v−i))1{vi − pi ≥ 0}
}
.
Then, let us consider the case where v′i > vi, we can construct the similar inequalities and obtain the right







q2i (vi, pi; p̂i) + (1− q2i (vi, pi; p̂i))1{vi − pi ≥ 0}
]
+ (1− q1i (vi,v−i))1{vi − pi ≥ 0}
}
.







q2i (vi, pi; p̂i) + (1− q2i (vi, pi; p̂i))1{vi − pi ≥ 0}
]
+ (1− q1i (vi,v−i))1{vi − pi ≥ 0}
}
.
Taking the integral of its derivative, we then have







q2i (t, pi; p̂i) + (1− q2i (t, pi; p̂i))1{t− pi ≥ 0}
]
+ (1− q1i (t,v−i))1{t− pi ≥ 0}
}
dt.
We complete the proof. 
Proof of Lemma 2













q2i (t, pi; p̂i) + (1− q2i (t, pi; p̂i))1{t− pi ≥ 0}
]







q21i(vi, pi; p̂i) + (1− q2i (vi, pi; p̂i))1{vi − pi ≥ 0}
]
+ (1− q1i (vi,v−i))1{vi − pi ≥ 0}
}






Now let us look at the total expected surplus of the seller and buyers, denoted by TE, which is given by






q2i (vi, pi; p̂i)vi + (1− q2i (vi, pi; p̂i)) max{vi − pi, 0}
]
+ (1− q1i (vi,v−i)) max{vi − pi, 0}.
]
Note that the total surplus means the sum of payoffs of the seller and the bidders in our paper. Therefore,
the expected surplus for the “third party” who offers the outside offer is not counted in. The seller’s revenue
R is the difference between the total expected surplus and the buyers’ expected payoffs, that is,













q2i (vi, pi; p̂i)vi + (1− q2i (vi, pi; p̂i)) max{vi − pi, 0}
]









q2i (vi, pi; p̂i) + (1− q2i (vi, pi; p̂i))1{vi − pi ≥ 0}
]
+ (1− q1i (vi,v−i))1{vi − pi ≥ 0}
}





























Let us further define virtual value as follows:
λ(vi, pi) =
 pi if pi ≤ vi;
J(vi) if pi > vi.

















q2i (vi, pi; p̂i)λ(vi, pi)
}
.
We complete the proof. 
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Proof of Proposition 1
From (5), we can now identify the cutoff p̂soi (vi,v−i) such that the corresponding q
2
i (vi, pi; p̂i) maximizes
Epi
{
q2i (vi, pi; p̂i)λ(vi, pi)
}
= Epi≥p̂i {λ(vi, pi)}, that is,









J(vi)dΦ(pi) if p̂i < vi.




 −J(vi)ϕ(p̂i) if p̂i ≥ vi;−p̂iϕ(p̂i) if p̂i < vi.
Clearly, if J(vi) ≥ 0, then
∂Epi≥p̂i{λ(vi,pi)}
∂p̂i
≤ 0,∀p̂i. Therefore, for vi < vMi where J(vM ) = 0, we should
have
p̂soi (vi,v−i) = 0, if vi ≥ vM .
If J(vi) < 0, then
∂Epi≥p̂i{λ(vi,pi)}
∂p̂i
≤ 0,∀p̂i < vi; and
∂Epi≥p̂i{λ(vi,pi)}
∂p̂i
> 0,∀p̂i > vi. Therefore, p̂soi (vi,v−i)






J(vi)dΦ(pi) and 0 to pin down the optimal
p̂soi (vi,v−i) :
p̂soi (vi,v−i) =
 0 if ς(vi) ≥ 0;
v̄ if ς(vi) < 0.













pidΦ(pi) > 0. Thus, there must exist a unique






J(v̌so)dΦ(pi) = 0. This indicates that















Summarizing the discussion above yields
p̂soi (vi,v−i) =
 0 if vi ≥ v̌
so;


























It is clear that Epi
{




= 0 for vi ≤ v̌so, since q2i (vi, pi; p̂soi (vi,v−i)) = 0 for vi ≤
v̌so. When vi > v̌
so, q2i (vi, pi; p̂
so
i (vi,v−i)) = 1 and thus Epi
{





Note that λ(vi, pi) strictly increases with vi. To maximize R, it is clear to set
qsoi (vi,v−i) =
 1 if vi = v
(1) and vi ≥ v̌so;
0 otherwise,
(21)
where v(1) = max{vi, i = 1, 2, ..., N}. In other words, only the bidder with the highest value is invited to
enter the second stage, provided the bidder’s value is no less than v̌so. This is equivalent to setting the
threshold at v̌so in the first stage.












































































where Q(vi) = F
N−1(vi). When bidder i is selected, vi should be no less than v̌




[1 − Φ(pi)]dpi, which gives the payment bidder i with value v̌so will pay conditional on being















































We complete the proof. 
Proof of Proposition 2
Given the fact that EIS [R(r,D)] = EIIS [R(r,D)] when r = D (implying that v̌ = v̂), Lemma 7 indicates
that for any D ∈ [rso, Dso], EIS [R(rI(D) = rso, D)] > EIS [R(rI(D) = D,D)] = EIIS [R(rII(D) = D,D)].
Therefore, r∗(D) = rso for any D ∈ [rso, Dso]; this proves part (i). Regarding part (ii), Lemma 8 states that
for any D ∈ [0, rso), EIS [R(rI(D) = D,D)] = EIIS [R(rII(D) = D,D)] < EIIS [R(rII(D) = r̃II(D), D)]. Hence,
r∗(D) = r̃II(D) for any D ∈ [0, rso). Note that in this case, r∗(D) is not necessary to be monotone in D
when D ∈ [0, rso). 
Proof of Proposition 3
For D ∈ [rso, Dso], we have R∗(D) = EIS [R(r∗(D), D)] where r∗(D) = rso. We have the following two steps
to establish the result:




































q(v̂(D)) = 0. (24)
This indicates that v̂(D) has no impact on EIS [R(r∗(D), D)].
Step (ii). Step (i) indicates that ∂∂v̂
EIS [R(r
∗(D),D)]
N |v̂=v̂(D) = 0, and we then have that the impact of D
through r∗(D) is zero by envelope theorem, as r∗(D) = rso is an interior optimum for the given D. We thus
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N denotes the partial derivative of
EIS [R(r,D)]
N with respect to D while fixing r and v̂.
Since ∂b̃(x)∂D =
−Φ(b̃(x)−D)
1−Φ(b̃(x)−D) , we have
∂b̃(x)
∂D






























































N ≥ 0 when D is in the interval of [r
so, Dso]. The equality holds if and only if
v̂(D) = v̄, which implies that the seller charges D = Dso.
For any D ∈ [0, rso), we have R∗(D) = EIIS [R(r∗(D), D)] where r∗(D) = r̃II(D) > D. The impact of r



































N denotes the partial derivative of
EIIS [R(r,D)]
N with respect to D while fixing r and






Summarizing the discussion above, we can conclude that charging D = Dso is optimal. Any (D, rso)
with D > Dso also maximizes seller’s revenue, since seller revenue does not change in D by Lemma 5.
Proof of Proposition 4
We separately prove parts (i), (ii), and (iii) as follow:
Part (i). Case (I) where r−D ≤ 0. First, given that Φ1(·) first-order stochastically dominates Φ2(·), i.e.




[1 − Φ2(pi)]dpi = r =
∫ v̌1
0
[1 − Φ1(pi)]dpi implies v̌1 < v̌2; (b)
∫ v̂2
0




[1− Φ1(pi)]dpi gives v̂1 < v̂2.
Second, we compare equilibrium bidding strategies across Φ1(·) and Φ2(·), given Φ1(·) < Φ2(·). For
convenience, we write b(vi,Φk) and b̃(vi,Φk), k = 1, 2 for vi ∈ [v̌k, v̂k] and vi > v̂k, respectively. We then
have the following:
1. For vi ∈ [v̌1, v̌2), b(vi,Φ1) =
∫ vi
0
[1 − Φ1(pi)]dpi ≥ r under Φ1(.), but the bidder under Φ2(.) does not
submit a valid bid, equivalently, b(vi,Φ2) = 0. Thus, b(vi,Φ1) > b(vi,Φ2).
2. For vi = v̌2, given that the equilibrium bidding strategy is monotone and increasing, the following
inequality must be true: b(vi,Φ1) > b(v̌1,Φ1) = b(vi,Φ2) = r. Thus, b(vi,Φ1) > b(vi,Φ2).
3. For vi ∈ (v̌2, v̂1], we have b(vi,Φ1) =
∫ vi
0
[1 − Φ1(pi)]dpi >
∫ vi
0
[1 − Φ2(pi)]dpi = b(vi,Φ2). Thus,
b(vi,Φ1) > b(vi,Φ2).
4. For vi ∈ (v̂1, v̂2), given that the equilibrium bidding strategy is monotone and increasing, we have






[1−Φ2(pi)]dpi = b(vi,Φ2). Thus, b̃(vi,Φ1) > b(vi,Φ2).
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5. For vi = v̂2, given that the equilibrium bidding strategy is monotone and increasing, the following
inequality must be true: b̃(vi,Φ1) > b(v̂1,Φ1) = b(vi,Φ2) = D. Thus, b̃(vi,Φ1) > b(vi,Φ2).
6. For vi ∈ (v̂2, v̄], recall that we can re-write b̃(vi,Φ) as
∫ vi
b̃(vi,Φ)−D[1−Φ(pi)]dpi = D, therefore, we have∫ vi
b̃(vi,Φ1)−D[1 − Φ1(pi)]dpi = D =
∫ vi
b̃(vi,Φ2)−D[1 − Φ2(pi)]dpi, which immediately indicates b̃(vi,Φ1) >
b̃(vi,Φ2).
Case (II) where r − D ≥ 0. Recall that
∫ v̌
r−D[1 − Φ(pi)]dpi = D. First, given that Φ1(·) first-order
stochastically dominates Φ2(·), i.e. Φ1(·) < Φ2(·), we can easily establish the following fact:
∫ v̌1
r−D[1 −
Φ1(pi)]dpi = D =
∫ v̌2
r−D[1− Φ2(pi)]dpi implies v̌1 < v̌2.
Second, we compare equilibrium bidding strategies across Φ1(·) and Φ2(·), given Φ1(·) < Φ2(·).
• For vi ∈ [v̌1, v̌2), b(vi,Φ1) ≥ r under Φ1(.), but the bidder under Φ2(.) does not submit a valid bid,
equivalently, b(vi,Φ2) = 0. Thus, b(vi,Φ1) > b(vi,Φ2).
• For vi = v̌2, given that the equilibrium bidding strategy is monotone and increasing, the following
inequality must be true: b(vi,Φ1) > b(v̌1,Φ1) = b(vi,Φ2) = r. Thus, b(vi,Φ1) > b(vi,Φ2).
• For vi ∈ (v̌2, v̄], recall that we can re-write b(vi,Φ) as
∫ vi
b(vi,Φ)−D[1−Φ(pi)]dpi = D, therefore, we have∫ vi
b(vi,Φ1)−D[1 − Φ1(pi)]dpi = D =
∫ vi
b(vi,Φ2)−D[1 − Φ2(pi)]dpi, which immediately indicates b(vi,Φ1) >
b(vi,Φ2).
Therefore, we can conclude that given reserve price r and deposit D, the equilibrium bid submitted by a
bidder is higher when the distribution of the outside offer becomes worse in the sense of first-order stochastic
dominance.
Part (ii). We examine how the optimal deposit Dso changes across different distributions of the outside











[1− Φ2(pi)]dpi = Dso2 .
Part (iii). Given that Φ1(·) first-order stochastically dominates Φ2(·), i.e., Φ1(·) < Φ2(·), let us denote
the optimal reserve price under Φi(·) by rsoi , i = 1, 2. Note that any sufficiently high D is optimal and fully
deters the winner’s default, and the optimal revenues under Φi(·), i = 1, 2 do not depend on D when it is
optimally set. Taking such a D, under (rso2 , D) the winner’s default is fully deterred even with Φ1(·). Since
Φ1(·) < Φ2(·), under (rso2 , D), we then have v̌1 < v̌2 and b(vi,Φ1) > b(vi,Φ2) by Proposition 4 and its proof.
Under (rso2 , D), seller revenue with Φ1(·) is given by














and the optimal seller revenue under Φ2(·) is given by































< 0, ∀v1 > v̌1.
Let R∗(rso1 , D,Φ1) denote the optimal seller revenue under Φ1. Thus, it is clear that R
∗(rso1 , D,Φ1) ≥
R(rso2 , D,Φ1) = R(v̌1) > R(v̌2) ≥ R∗(rso2 , D,Φ2). 
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Online Appendices for “Deposit Requirement in Auctions” by X.
Che, T. Li, J. Lu, and X. Zheng
1 Appendix S1
This online appendix covers the analyses of a second-price auction with deposit and reserve price (Section
1.1), percentage deposit (Section 1.2), and deposit proportionally deducted from full payment (Section 1.3).
1.1 Second-price auction format
Given the specific auction format (second-price auction) with deposit D and reserve price r, we modify
the game in Section 2 as follows: A seller sells an indivisible object to N risk-neutral bidders through a sealed-
bid, second-price auction, where 1 < N < ∞. The seller’s reservation value of the object is normalized to
zero. Bidders’ private values, denoted by vi, i = 1, 2, ..., N , are independent draws from a common atomless
distribution F (·) with density f(·) > 0 over the support [0, v̄], where v > 0. After the auction, each bidder
i will receive an outside offer, which gives the same object (the same value vi) but with a random price,
denoted by pi. Prices pi, i = 1, 2, ..., N , are random draws from a common atomless distribution Φ(·) with
density ϕ(·) > 0 over [0, v̄]. F and Φ are common knowledge among the seller and bidders, and they are
regular in the sense that the hazard rates f(·)1−F (·) and
ϕ(·)
1−Φ(·) are increasing. Figure 1 depicts the timing of
the game, which is comprised of four stages.
The seller
at t = 0








Winning bidder i at
t = 3: The original
transaction or the











with price pi at
t = 3
Figure 1: Timing
At stage t = 0, the seller announces a reserve price r ∈ [0, v̄] and a winner-pay deposit D ∈ [0,+∞).
The seller commits to both the reserve price and the deposit requirement.
At t = 1, all N bidders observing r and D decide whether to enter and submit bids in the auction. If
1
a bidder chooses not to enter, the bidder then simply waits for the outside offer with a random price at
t = 3. For convenience, a nonparticipant’s bid is denoted by “∅.” If bidder i enters the auction, we denote
her bid by bi ∈ [r,+∞). All the entering bidders simultaneously submit their bids. The highest-bid bidder
wins the auction. If there is a tie, the object goes to each winning bidder with equal probability. The full
payment (the auction price) is denoted by κ, which equals r if there is only one valid bid and equals the
second-highest bid otherwise. Slightly abusing the notations, we have κ ≡ max{r, b(1)−i }, where b
(1)
−i stands
for the losing bidders’ highest bid. All the losing bidders will face their outside offers at t = 3. If there is no
valid bid, the auction game ends, and the seller keeps the object.
At t = 2, the winning bidder i decides whether to pay D. Let us denote the winner’s decision by
ei ∈ {0, 1}, with ei = 1 for “paying D” and ei = 0 for “not paying D.” If the winning bidder i does not pay
D, i.e., ei = 0, the seller keeps the object, and the winning bidder is to face the outside offer or not make the
purchase at t = 3. If ei = 1, the winning bidder i has three options at t = 3: either completing the current
transaction, or adopting the outside offer, or not purchasing at all. Note that we assume if κ < D the seller,
conditional on D being paid, pays D− κ back to the winner when the final transaction goes through. Thus,
the total payment to the seller is still the auction price κ.
At t = 3, the random price pi for the outside offer is realized. Conditional on ei = 1, the winning bidder
i decides whether to complete the current transaction by paying the remaining payment κ−D, or to take the
outside offer by paying price pi, or to not make the purchase at all. If the winning bidder i does not complete
the transaction, the deposit D is forfeited, and the seller keeps the object. We denote the winner’s decision
by oi, where oi = 1 for “taking the outside offer” and oi = 0 for “completing the original transaction.” For
completeness, we write oi = NP for “no purchase.”
For all other cases (a losing bidder or a winning bidder who does not pay the deposit D), we denote a
bidder j’s decision on whether to take the outside offer at t = 3 by ŏj , where ŏj = 1 for “taking the outside
offer with price pj” and ŏj = NP for “no purchase.”
The strategies of the seller and a bidder as well as the equilibrium concept are defined as follows: Before
the bidding stage starts, the seller sets reserve price r and deposit D at t = 0. Given r and D, a bidder
makes four decisions: first, how much to bid at the bidding stage at t = 1; second, conditional on winning
the auction, whether to pay the deposit at t = 2; third, conditional on winning the auction and paying the
deposit at t = 2, whether to take the outside offer with price pi, or complete the original transaction by
paying κ−D, or not make the purchase at all at t = 3; and fourth, conditional on not winning the auction
at t = 1 or winning at t = 1 but not paying the deposit at t = 2, whether to take the outside offer with price
pi at t = 3.
The bidding strategy for bidder i at t = 1 is a mapping from private value vi to bid bi; that is, bi(vi) :
2
[0,∞) → [r,+∞) ∪ {∅}. Note that bi is valid if and only if bi ≥ r. Conditional on winning at the bidding
stage, the strategy of the winning bidder i regarding whether to pay the deposit is a mapping from private
value vi and full payment κ to deposit payment decision ei at t = 2: ei(vi, κ) : [0, v] × [r,∞) → {0, 1}.
Contingent on paying the deposit at t = 2, the strategy of the winning bidder i regarding whether to
complete the original transaction or opt for the outside offer or not make the purchase is a mapping from
private value vi, full payment κ, and price pi of the outside offer to decision oi at t = 3: oi(vi, κ, pi) :
[0, v] × [r,∞) × [0, v] → {0, 1} ∪ {NP}. Conditional on not winning the auction or winning but not
paying the deposit, the strategy of bidder i regarding whether to purchase from the outside offer is a mapping
from private value vi and price pi of the outside offer to decision ŏi at t = 3: ŏi(vi, pi) : [0, v] × [0, v] →
{0, 1} ∪ {NP}.
The equilibrium concept in this paper is perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE). Given r and D, we first
characterize bidder i’s strategies concerning the outside offer at t = 3, i.e., oi(vi, κ, pi) and ŏi(vi, pi), examine
the winning bidder i’s decision on paying the deposit at t = 2, i.e., ei(vi, κ), and derive the equilibrium
bidding strategy bi(vi) at t = 1. Finally, we characterize the seller’s optimal choices on r and D at t = 0.
1
1.1.1 Decision on taking the outside offer at t = 3
If bidder i does not submit a valid bid, or submits a valid bid but does not win the auction, or does not
pay D conditional on winning, the only choice left at t = 3 is the outside offer with random price pi. The
characterization of the bidder i’s strategy ŏi(·, ·) is clear: takes the offer if vi ≥ pi; otherwise, chooses not to
make the purchase.
Next, we consider the bidder i’s strategy oi(·, ·, ·) conditional on winning and paying the deposit. The
winning bidder i has three choices at t = 3: takes the outside offer with price pi, or completes the original
transaction with payment κ − D, or not make the purchase at all. The following is the optimal decision
oi(vi, κ, pi) for the winning bidder i:























When vi ≥ κ − D, the winning bidder i completes the original transaction if pi ≥ κ − D and takes the
1In the following analysis, we restrict our attention to (weakly) undominated strategies. This helps rule out many
uninteresting equilibria that generally arise in second-price auctions. For example, there may exist an equilibrium
that a bidder submits v̄ regardless of her true value and other bidders bid zero. Then, the winning bidder makes
decisions on paying the deposit and taking the outside offer. However, this equilibrium is not admissible as bidding
v̄ is weakly dominated by submitting bi ≤ vi, given bidding zero from other bidders. See discussion on all Nash
equilibria of second-price auction by Blume and Heidhues (2004).
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outside offer if pi < κ−D. However, when vi < κ−D,2 the winning bidder takes the outside offer if pi ≤ vi;
otherwise, he chooses not to make the purchase.
1.1.2 Decision on paying the deposit at t = 2
Here we examine the winning bidder i’s decision on paying deposit D at t = 2. If the winner pays the
deposit D, i.e., ei = 1, there are two possibilities: κ −D ≥ 0 or κ −D < 0. In the case where κ −D ≥ 0,
depending on pi Q κ−D, the winning bidder can choose to either complete the original transaction or take
the outside offer t = 3, as described in (A1). However, if κ − D < 0, the price pi of the outside offer will
certainly be greater than κ−D, which implies that the winner will always complete the original transaction.
Given the two cases above, we can construct the winning bidder i’s payoff from paying D at t = 2, denoted





(vi − pi)ϕ(pi)dpi +
∫ v
κ−D[vi − (κ−D)]ϕ(pi)dpi −D if κ−D ≥ 0;∫ v
0
[vi − (κ−D)]ϕ(pi)dpi −D if κ−D < 0.
(A2)
If the winning bidder i does not pay the deposit D, i.e., ei = 0, her only choice at t = 3 is to face the





(vi − pi)ϕ(pi)dpi. (A3)
It is clear that the winning bidder i is willing to pay the deposit D if and only if πD(vi, κ) ≥ πND(vi).
Defining L = πD(vi, κ)−πND(vi), our analysis includes the following two cases. In the case where κ−D ≥ 0,
L(vi, κ) = vi−κ−
∫ vi
κ−D Φ(pi)dpi, which indicates that given κ and D, there should exist a unique threshold
for bidder i’s private value, denoted by v′i(κ) ∈ [0, v], such that L(vi, κ) > 0 if and only if vi > v′i(κ). In the
case where κ−D < 0, L(vi, κ) = vi − κ−
∫ vi
0
Φ(pi)dpi, implying that there should exist a unique threshold
v′′i (κ) ∈ [0, v], such that L(vi, κ) > 0 if and only if vi > v′′i (κ). Summarizing the discussion above gives the















1.1.3 Bidders’ Equilibrium Strategies
Let us now examine the equilibrium bidding strategy at t = 1. We first present the following useful
2This is an out-of-equilibrium event, as it implies that the bidder submitted a bid greater than vi.
4
lemma.
Lemma 3. It is a dominated strategy for a bidder to submit any bid greater than her private value, i.e.,
bi > vi.
The proof of Lemma 3 is straightforward. Submitting bi > vi makes the bidder win additionally when
b
(1)
−i is between vi and bi. Obviously, winning with such a price is weakly dominated by waiting for the
outside offer with random price pi. Lemma 3 allows us to focus on bi ≤ vi (which implies κ ≤ vi and
further κ−D ≤ vi, conditional on bidder i winning the auction) for the equilibrium characterization in the
subsequent subgames.
Each bidder at t = 1 faces two choices: either bidding in the auction or waiting for the outside offer
directly. In the equilibrium, the bid submitted by the bidder should make her indifferent between these two
choices, specifically between “winning at her own bid and then paying the deposit” and “not submitting a
bid but waiting for the outside offer directly.” We call this insight the “payoff-indifference condition,” which
leads to a symmetric increasing bidding strategy, denoted by b(vi).
3 Furthermore, whether a bidder after
winning has a chance to default and take the outside offer depends on both the deposit and the reserve
price. Given the same r and D, a bidder with a relatively low private value would not choose to default
after paying the deposit; however, this may not be true if the bidder is with a sufficiently high private value.
Therefore, when we utilize the “payoff-indifference condition” to construct the equilibrium bidding strategy
for bidders in the following, we need to separately consider two cases in which, after winning and paying,
the bidder still has a chance to default. More specifically, we pin down the details of the equilibrium bidding
strategy by considering Case (I) where r ≤ D and Case (II) where r ≥ D.








Note that if b(v̄) ≤ r, we then have v̌ ≥ v̄, and there is no participation from bidders. If b(v̄) ≤ D, we have
v̂ ≥ v̄, and no bidder will bid more than the deposit D.
In Case (I) where r ≤ D, we have v̂ ≥ v̌. Let us consider bidding strategies for the bidders separately in
the valuation intervals of vi ∈ [v̌, v̂] and vi ∈ (v̂, v].
When vi ∈ [v̌, v̂], the bidder, after winning, always chooses to complete the original transaction. The
3The bidding strategy b(vi) is a weakly dominant strategy. In the proof of Proposition B0, we will show that
submitting a bid lower than b(vi) cannot be beneficial to the bidder. Bidding higher than b(vi) would increase the
probability of winning but lower the bidder’s expected payoff, which encourages the bidder to wait for the outside
offer instead.
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where the first term on the left hand side is the expected payoff from bidding and paying the deposit D
(conditional on winning) in the auction, and the right hand side is the expected payoff from waiting for the
outside offer directly. Rearranging the equation gives
b = vi −
∫ vi
0




When vi ∈ (v̂, v], the bidder, after winning, has two options of either completing the original transaction
or taking the outside offer, depending on pi Q b−D. The “payoff-indifference condition” gives
∫ b−D
0










where the first term and the second term on the left hand side present the expected payoffs from taking the
outside offer if pi ≤ b−D and completing the original transaction if pi > b−D, respectively; the term on the
right hand side is the expected payoff from waiting for the outside offer directly. Re-arranging the equation
yields
b = vi −
∫ vi
b−D














Φ(pi)dpi if vi ∈ [v̌, v̂];
∅ if vi < v̌.
(A7)
It is easy to check that in (A5), dbdvi = 1−Φ(vi) > 0, and in (A6),
db
dvi





0; b(vi) is increasing in vi and decreasing in D. Clearly, (A6) coincides with (A5) when vi = v̂.
In Case (II) where r ≥ D, we have v̂ ≤ v̌; only the bidder with vi ∈ [v̌, v̄] can submit a valid bid, and
after winning, the bidder has two options of either completing the original transaction or taking the outside
offer, depending on pi Q b−D. The construction of the equilibrium bidding strategy is similar to (A6) but
6






Φ(pi)dpi if vi ≥ v̌;
∅ if vi < v̌.
(A8)
Again, it is easy to check that b(vi) is increasing in vi and decreasing in D.
Based on the discussion above, we have the following result.
Proposition B0. In the auction, bidder i adopts the weakly dominant bidding strategies (A7) or (A8),
depending on r Q D.
Proof. Most of the result was already shown in the text in Section 1.1.3. The only task left is to establish
the dominance of the equilibrium bidding strategy, in other words, check whether a bidder has an incentive
to deviate from the bidding strategy characterized in (A7) and (A8). Given that bidder i submits b(vi) in
the auction, and the payoffs are:
Πi =
 πD(vi, κ) if winning ;
πND(vi) if not winning ,
where πD(vi, κ) and πND(vi) are given by (A2) and (A3), respectively, in Section 1.1.2 above. Since b(vi) ≥ κ,
we have πD(vi, κ) ≥ πND(vi) and the equality holds when b(vi) = κ. Suppose now that bidder i does not
follow the equilibrium bidding strategy b(vi) (in short, b) but submits z in the auction, then we consider the
following two cases:
Case (a) where z < b. If b > z > κ, then bidder i still wins and that the surplus πD(vi, κ) is not affected.
If κ > b > z, bidder i still loses in the auction and the surplus πND(vi) is from facing the outside offer. If
b > κ > z, the bidder will lose and obtain πND(vi), where, however, he would have won and got πD(vi, κ) if
he had bid b. Thus, there is no incentive to bid lower than b.
Case (b) where z > b. If z > b > κ, then bidder i still wins and that the surplus πD(vi, κ) is not affected.
If κ > z > b, bidder i still loses in the auction and obtains πND(vi) is from facing the outside offer. If
z > κ > b, by doing so it increases the probability of winning, but it is more profitable for the bidder to
simply wait for the outside offer directly, as πD(vi, κ) is now strictly less than πND(vi). Thus, there is no
incentive to bid higher than b.
Therefore, we can conclude that b is a weakly dominate strategy for bidder i in the auction game.
Proposition B0 characterizes how bidders respond in their bids when facing a deposit requirement in the
auction; a higher deposit requirement induces a higher v̂ which lowers the possibility of ex-post default (or
7
the chance to take the outside offer). As a consequence, bidders submit lower bids in the auction as their best
responses. If the seller chooses not to demand any deposit from the winner, i.e., D = 0, the only solution is
b(vi) = vi.
4 We therefore have the following remark.
Remark 2. In the auction, bidders bid truthfully when the seller does not require a deposit.
This interesting observation indicates that the bidders submitting lower bids, i.e., lower than their private
values, is not due to the existence of the post-auction outside offer but rather to the deposit requirement of
the seller.
Furthermore, given the characterizations of the bidding strategies in Cases (I) and (II), the following
lemma demonstrates how thresholds v̌ and v̂ change with r and D.
Lemma 4. (i) In Case (I) where r ≤ D, v̌ is increasing in r but independent of D and v̂ is increasing in
D but independent of r. (ii) In Case (II) where r ≥ D, v̌ is increasing in both r and D.
Proof. Case (I) where r −D ≤ 0. Given r = v̌ −
∫ v̌
0



















Clearly, v̂ increases with D but is independent of r(≤ D).
Case (II) where r −D ≥ 0. Given r = v̌ −
∫ v̌


































We then have that v̌ is increasing in both r and D.
From Lemma 4, we derive the following corollary on how the equilibrium bidding strategy depends on the
reserve price, which will be useful for the analysis of the optimal reserve price in the next section.
Corollary B0. Reserve price r affects equilibrium bidding strategy b(vi) through v̌.
4Given r ≥ 0, if D = 0, then b(v̌) ≥ 0, and the bidding strategy in (A8) can be written as
∫ vi
b
[1 − Φ(pi)]dpi = 0,
which implies truthful bidding from bidders.
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Proofs of Lemmas 5 - 8
The following four lemmas help us characterize the optimal reserve price maximizing the seller’s revenue
for a given deposit.
Lemma 5. EIS [R(r,D)] is independent of D for any D ≥ Dso.
Proof. If the seller chooses any D > Dso, v̂ takes the corner solution v̄, i.e., v̂ = v̄, and the seller’s expected
revenue can be re-written as follows:








which does not change with D. Note that b(x) does not depend on D when D ≥ Dso. 
Lemma 6. (i) In Case (I) where r ≤ D, given any D > Dso, EIS [R(r,D)] = 0 for all r ∈ [Dso, D]. (ii) In
Case (II) where r ≥ D, EIIS [R(r,D)] = 0 for all r ≥ Dso.
Proof. Given the restrictions of r ≤ D in Case (I) and r ≥ D in Case (II), we show that the seller obtains
zero revenue when r ≥ Dso.
Case (I) where r −D ≤ 0, seller revenue with any D > Dso is given by








Further, if the seller sets r ≥ Dso (but still less than D), then v̌ takes the corner solution v̄, i.e., v̌ = v̄. As
a result, no one can submit a valid bid and the seller’s revenue decreases to zero.
Case (II) where r −D ≥ 0. With r ≥ Dso, v̌ takes the corner solution v̄, i.e., v̌ = v̄. As a result, no one
can submit a valid bid and the seller’s revenue decreases to zero. 
Lemmas 5 and 6 help us restrict our analysis to the area of (r,D) ∈ [0, Dso] × [0, Dso]. Given any
D ∈ [0, Dso], let us use rI(D) to denote the optimal reserve price in Case (I) where r ≤ D. We first
maximize (12) without taking into account the restriction of r ≤ D; in this case, we denote the unrestricted
optimal reserve price by r̃I(D). We next check whether or not rI(D) = r̃I(D), i.e., r̃I(D) can be implemented
in Case (I). We follow the same procedure to examine (13) and denote the optimal reserve price in Case
(II) by rII(D) and the unrestricted optimal reserve price without the constraint of r ≥ D by r̃II(D). The
following lemmas present the optimal choices on the reserve price in Cases (I) and (II), given D ∈ [0, Dso].
Lemma 7. For any D ∈ [rso, Dso], (i) in Case (I) where r ≤ D, rI(D) = r̃I(D) = rso, and (ii) in Case
(II) where r ≥ D, rII(D) = D ≥ r̃II(D).
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Proof. Let us separately consider the following two cases. Part (i). We re-write EIS [R(r,D)] as follows:










































































where q(·) = Q′(·). Recall that ∂v̌∂r =
1





But clearly, v̌ = 0 cannot be optimal, because ∂∂r
EIS [R(r,D)]
N > 0 when v̌ is slightly above zero. As long as
F is regular (increasing hazard rate), the optimum must occur when the term in the square brackets equals
zero. We thus have at optimum[




























The analysis above indicates that the unrestricted optimal reserve price r̃I(D) is exactly equal to rso for
any D ≥ 0. Moreover, for any D ∈ [rso, Dso], we have r ≤ D and the unrestricted optimal reserve price is
feasible; therefore, rI(D) = r̃I(D) = rso.
Part (ii). We re-write EIIS [R(r,D)] as follows:














































































Recall that ∂v̌∂r =
1−Φ(r−D)




N is 0. But as long
as F is regular (increasing hazard rates), ∂∂r
EIIS [R(r,D)]
N = 0 should occur when the term in the big square








N = 0 if and only if D = r
so and r = D. This property helps us to
see under conditions which the term in the big square bracket is zero.
Given b(v̌) = r, we re-write the term in the large square bracket of last line in (A16) and show that it






































Step (1). When D = rso and r = D, i.e., v̌ = v̌so, we have








Step (2). When D = rso and r − rso > 0, we can then write Λ as follows:
Λ = −
[(
1− Φ(r − rso)
)










1− ϕ(r − r
so)





Note that −[(1 − Φ(r − rso))(r − rso) + rso] < −rso, and further, since v̌ > v̌so and the hazard rates of F
and Φ are increasing, we have (1−F (v̌))(1−Φ(v̌))f(v̌) decreases with v̌ and
1−Φ(r−rso)
ϕ(r−rso) decreases with r, implying







1− ϕ(r − r
so)


















Therefore, we have Λ < −rso + (1−F (v̌
so))(1−Φ(v̌so))
f(v̌so) = 0.
Step (3). Let us consider any D ∈ (rso, Dso]. Define ω = r − D ≥ 0 and denote the inverse bidding









1− F (b−1(ω + rso + (D − rso), D))
f(b−1(ω + rso + (D − rso), D))
(








We now use D′ to denote the deposit when D > rso and D′′ to denote the deposit when D = rso. Given
the same v and D′ > D′′, we have b(v,D′) < b(v,D′′), as b(v,D) is decreasing in D. Further, b(v,D) is
increasing in v, indicating that given the same b, we should have v′ > v′′ for b(v′, D′) = b(v′′, D′′). This
property implies that with the same bid ω+ rso, we should have b−1(ω+ rso, D′) > b−1(ω+ rso, D′′). Thus,
from equation (A21), we have[
1− F (b−1(ω + rso + (D′ − rso), D′))
f(b−1(ω + rso + (D′ − rso), D′))
(




1− F (b−1(ω + rso, D′))
f(b−1(ω + rso, D′))
(




1− F (b−1(ω + rso, D′′))
f(b−1(ω + rso, D′′))
(














Since r ≥ D > rso, we have Λ < −rso+ (1−F (v̌
so))(1−Φ(v̌so))
f(v̌so) = 0. We can conclude that for any D ∈ [r
so, Dso]
and r ≥ D, ∂∂r
EIIS [R(r,D)]




N = 0 when D = r
so and r = D. This established
property indicates that the unrestricted optimal reserve price r̃II(D) must be smaller than or equal to D,
i.e., r̃II(D) ≤ D for any D ∈ [rso, Dso] (the equality holds if and only if D = rso and r = D), and therefore,
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in Case (II) where r ≥ D, r̃II(D) is not implementable and EIIS [R(r,D)] is maximized at the boundary
condition of rII(D) = D.
Finally, Λ in (A18) is decreasing in r (≤ D), as v̌ increases with r. This indicates that the term in the
big square bracket in (A16) single crosses zero when r ≤ D. We thus have unconstrained optimum r̃II(D)
is uniquely defined by Λ = 0. 
Lemma 8. For any D ∈ [0, rso), (i) in Case (I) where r ≤ D, rI(D) = D ≤ r̃I(D) = rso, and (ii) in Case
(II) where r ≥ D, rII(D) = r̃II(D).
Proof. We examine rI(D) and rII(D) for any D ∈ [0, rso).
Part (i). From Lemma 7(i), we have shown that the unrestricted optimal reserve price r̃I(D) is equal to
rso for any D ≥ 0. From (A14), since (1−F (v̌))(1−Φ(v̌))f(v̌) decreases with v̌ and
∫ v̌
0
[1− Φ(pi)]dpi increases with



















The inequality above implies that ∂∂r
EIS [R(r,D)]
N > 0 for any D ∈ [0, r
so) and r ≤ D. Therefore, under case
(I) where r ≤ D, r̃I(D) is not feasible for any D ∈ [0, rso) and EIS [R(r,D)] is maximized at the boundary
condition of rI(D) = D.
Part (ii). Given the fact that (1−F (v̌))(1−Φ(v̌))f(v̌) decreases with v̌, (A18) gives the following inequality for


















The inequality above implies that ∂∂r
EIIS [R(r,D)]
N > 0 for any D ∈ [0, r
so) and r = D. Similar to proof of
Lemma 7(ii), we can establish that Λ in (A18) is decreasing in r (≤ D). Therefore, we have that for any
D ∈ [0, rso) the unrestricted optimal reserve price r̃II(D) is greater than D and feasible in Case (II) where
r ≥ D, i.e., rII(D) = r̃II(D). 
1.1.4 Figures to illustrate the optimal D and r
We here use the following figures to illustrate the seller’s choice on reserve price for any given deposit.
Figure 2 presents a graphic illustration of how rI(D) varies when D changes in [0, Dso]. The X-axis is
the reserve price, and the Y-axis is the deposit. The seller’s choice of rI(D) is marked by bold red. For
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D ∈ [0, rso), rI(D) is equal to D, which is located on the 45-degree line, for D ∈ [rso, Dso], rI(D) is equal to
rso, and the seller’s revenue becomes independent of D when D > Dso. Figure 3 graphically illustrates how
rII(D) varies when D changes in [0, Dso], which is marked by bold red. For D ∈ [0, rso), rII(D) is greater
than the deposit D (below the 45-degree line), for D ∈ [rso, Dso], rII(D) is equal to D (which is located
along the 45-degree line), and for any D > Dso, the seller’s revenue becomes independent of D. Figure
4 graphically depicts the optimal reserve price r∗(D), which achieves the overall maximized seller revenue
across Cases (I) and (II). In the figure, r∗(D) is marked by bold blue. For D ∈ [rso, Dso], r∗(D) is equal to





































Figure 4: r∗(D) for D ∈ [0, Dso]
1.2 Percentage deposit
Let γ ∈ [0, 1] denote the percentage of the final price the seller requires as the deposit. Then, conditional
on winning, the deposit amount bidder i as the winner needs to pay can be written as D = γκ. Clearly, the
analyses we have constructed for the outside option strategy in (A1) is not affected. We then look at the
deposit strategy. Since the percentage deposit cannot be greater than the final price, the deposit strategy is
the same as the case where κ − D ≥ 0 in Section 1.1.2. Next let us examine the bidding strategy. Again,
15
the construction of the equilibrium bid should make a bidder indifferent between “winning at her own bid
and then paying the deposit” and “not submitting a bid but waiting for the outside offer directly,” that is,
∫ (1−γ)b
0
(vi − pi)ϕ(p)dpi +
∫ v̄
(1−γ)b








Given r and γ, we write the bidding strategy as b(vi). It is easy to show that b(vi) is increasing in vi
and decreasing in γ, as ∂b(vi)∂vi =
1−Φ(vi)




1−Φ(b(vi)(1−γ))(1−γ) < 0. Given that
b(v̌) = r, the seller’s expected revenue denoted by ES [R(r, γ)] is given by






































b(x) + Φ(b(x)(1− γ))γb(x)
]
dQ(x).
The seller chooses r and γ to maximize ES [R(r, γ)]. We introduce notations γso and rso as follows:









[1−Φ(pi)]dpi. Let us write r∗(γ) to denote the optimal
reserve price, given any γ. We can then establish the following result.
Proposition B1. dES [R(r
∗(γ),γ)]
dγ ≥ 0 for any γ ∈ [0, 1]. In particular,
dES [R(r∗(γ),γ)]
dγ = 0 when γ = γ
so. As a
result, the combination of γso and rso maximizes the seller’s revenue. Moreover, ES [R(rso, γso)] = R∗(Dso).
Proof. Our proof includes the following two steps:


















b(v̌) + Φ(b(v̌)(1− γ))γb(v̌)
]












When v̌ = 0, the derivative is 0. But as long as F is regular (increasing hazard rate), then ∂∂v̌
ES [R(r,γ)]
N = 0
should occur when the term in the large square bracket is zero. This gives the unrestricted v̌(r∗(γ), γ) and
further, the optimal reserve price r∗(γ) is given by b(v̌(r∗(γ), γ)).




















1− F (v̌(r∗(γ), γ))
)
Q(v̌(r∗(γ), γ))





















N > 0, in-
dicating that it is optimal for the seller to choose γso = 1. Plugging γso = 1 and ∂b(vi)∂vi =
1−Φ(vi)
1−Φ(b(vi)(1−γ))(1−γ)
into the term in large square bracket of the last line of (A25) gives v̌so and rso:
















Note that the optimal reserve and bidding cutoff are exactly the same as in our main analysis.
Step (iii). Finally, plugging γso = 1 and rso into ES [R(r, γ)] yields








= EIS [R(rso, Dso)]
= R∗(Dso).
(A29)
The intuition of the result above is consistent with what we had before. The seller’s expected revenue
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is maximized when the default possibility from the winner is zero. To do this, the seller should set the
percentage sufficiently high (equal to 100 percent) so that the winner’s default possibility is fully deterred.
Moreover, at the optimal level, the percentage deposit requirement is equivalent to the fixed amount deposit
requirement, generating the same maximized seller revenue. 
1.3 Deposit proportionally deducted from full payment
So far, we have analyzed the deposit requirement in which the amount the winner paid will be completely
deducted from the full payment. However, in practice sellers also commonly implement another type of de-
posit requirement where the amount paid by the winners is in addition to the full payment. For convenience,
we call the former the inclusive deposit requirement, and the latter the exclusive deposit requirement. It is
of interest to compare the two types of the deposit requirements, in particular, which one would benefit the
seller more in terms of the expected revenue, or whether they would yield the same expected revenue to the
seller. It seems that the exclusive deposit requirement is more profitable, as it is an additional fee, besides
the final price, charged by the seller. However, because of this additional “cost” after winning, the bidders
would strategically adjust their bids (intuitively, to submit lower bids) in the auction. Thus, the comparison
is not trivial and obvious.
Instead of focusing only on these two particular deposit rules, we here provide a more general analysis.
Denote the deduction proportion of the deposit D from the full payment by α ∈ [0, 1]. Given α, the winner
needs to pay κ−αD to complete the transaction. In other words, the winner’s total payment is κ+(1−α)D
for the object. Here, the inclusive and exclusive deposit requirements correspond to the two special cases
with α = 1 and α = 0, respectively. In the second-price auction with b(v̌) = r and b(v̂) = αD, bidders’
bidding strategies at t = 1 can be re-written as follows:









Φ(pi)dpi − (1− α)D if vi ∈ [v̌, v̂];
∅ if vi < v̌,































where the bidding strategies are denoted by b(vi) and b̃(vi) for vi ∈ [v̌, v̂] and vi ∈ (v̂, v̄], respectively.
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b(vi)−αD Φ(pi)dpi − (1− α)D if vi ≥ v̌;
∅ if vi < v̌,































[1− Φ(pi)]dpi and rso =
∫ v̌so
0
[1− Φ(pi)]dpi − (1− α)Dso,





[1 − Φ(pi)]dpi. Interestingly, we see that
although the thresholds of v̂so and v̌so and the optimal deposit Dso are the same as before, the optimal
reserve price rso depends on the deduction proportion rule. Furthermore, rso increases in α and therefore
there must exist a threshold, called α̃ > 0, such that rso = 0. This fact indicates that if the seller wants to
implement deduction proportion rule α < α̃, the optimal reserve price should be a negative value, implying
that submitting negative-valued bids from bidders should be allowed.
We next examine the impacts of the deduction proportion rule on seller’s revenue. In particular, we are
interested in comparing seller revenues across different proportion rules, answering the question of whether
there exists an optimal proportion α to the seller. Let us denote the expected seller revenues and bidding
strategies associated with two proportion rules α and α′ by EIS [R(r,D, α)] and EIS [R(r,D, α′)], and b(vi, α)
and b(vi, α
′), respectively, where α, α′ ∈ [0, 1] and α 6= α′. We can then establish the following result.
Proposition B2. If submitting negative-valued bids is allowed, the seller’s expected revenue with the optimal
rso and Dso is independent of the deduction proportion rule α.
Proof. Our proof can be split into the following three steps: Step (i). We first assume that v̌, v̂, and D
are exactly the same across both deduction proportion rules α and α′, then the equilibrium bidding strategies
show:
If vi ∈ [v̌, v̂], the equilibrium bidding strategy implies the following fact that
b(vi, α) + (1− α)D = vi −
∫ vi
0
Φ(pi)dpi = b(vi, α
′) + (1− α′)D. (A30)
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If vi ∈ (v̂, v], from the equilibrium bidding strategy, we have the fact that∫ vi
b̃(vi,α)−αD





b̃(vi, α)− αD = b̃(vi, α′)− α′D. (A32)
Step (ii). Given what we have in step (i.), we can establish the equivalence between EIS [R(r,D, α)] and



































































This implies that E[R(r,D, α)] exactly equals E[R(r,D, α′)]; both settings generate the same revenue to the
seller.
Step (iii). The optimal v̌so, v̂so, and Dso do not depend on the deduction proportion rule α. Therefore,
if submitting negative-value bids from bidders is allowed, the maximized revenue of the seller is independent
of the deduction proportion rule α. 
A bidder will strategically adjust her bid as the best response to the deduction proportion rule imple-
mented by the seller; a higher deduction proportion induces a higher bid from the bidder, that is, b > b′ if
α > α′. Interestingly, we show that if negative-valued bids are allowed, the seller obtains exactly the same
expected revenue for all α. We call this property the “deduction proportion independence.” However, in
practice, it is unlikely (if not impossible) to allow negative-valued bids. Obviously if the seller imposes a
further constraint r ≥ 0, implementing a lower α should generate a lower revenue to the seller.
Corollary B1. If bidders can only submit non-negative bids, the maximized seller revenue is increasing in
α.
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This result above indicates that the “deduction proportion independence” breaks down if a “non-negative-
bid” restriction is imposed in the auction, and this implies that the exclusive deposit requirement is worse
than the inclusive deposit requirement in terms of seller revenue. This provides an explanation of why the
latter is relatively more popular in practice.
21
2 Appendix S2
This online appendix covers all the computation details in numerical examples 1 and 2.
2.1 Numerical example 1
Taking N = 2 and vi ∼ U [0, 1], pi ∼ U [0, 1], we have the following two parts for the computations.
Case (I) where r ≤ D. In the second-price auction, v̌ and v̂ for any given r and D can be computed by
the following two equations:
r = v̌ − 1
2
v̌2, and D = v̂ − 1
2
v̂2.









− 2vi + v2i + (D + 1)2 −D2
] 1
2
if vi > v̂;
vi − 12v
2
i if vi ∈ [v̌, v̂];
No if vi < v̌.
The associated seller’s revenue function is given by
EIS [R(r,D)]











b̃(vi, r,D) + (b̃(vi, r,D)−D)D
]
dvi











v2i − 2vi + 2D + 1− v
2
i + 2vi −D − 1
]
dvi,
where v̌ = 1−
√
1− 2r and v̂ = 1−
√
1− 2D.
Case (II) where r ≥ D. In a second-price auction, we can compute v̌ for any given r and D by the
following equation:















(vi − 1)2 + 2D
] 1
2
if vi ≥ v̌;
No if vi < v̌.


































where v̌ = 1−
√
1− 4r + 2D − (r −D)2.
Our computations show rso = 0.33333 and Dso = 0.5.5 Moreover, when the seller sets r ≥ 0.5, no valid
bids can be submitted, and the seller’s revenue decreases to zero. Given the deposit D(= 0.2, 0.33333, 0.4),
Figures 5 depicts how seller revenue functions in Cases (I) and (II) change in r. In each figure, the horizontal
axes is reserve price r and the vertical axes is seller revenue Es(R). E
I
s (R) is depicted by the blue curve and
EIIs (R) by the red curve. Consistent with these properties established in Lemmas 7 and 8 and Proposition
2, our simulation results show that in Figures 5(a), given D > rso, the maximized seller revenue is given by
EIs (R) with reserve price r
so. With D = 0.33333, both Cases (I) and (II) give the same maximized seller
revenue with reserve price rso in Figure 5(b). When D = 0.2, the maximized seller revenue is achieved under
Case (II) with some reserve price less than rso.
Figure 6 depicts the property characterized in Proposition 3; the seller’s optimal revenue function R∗(D)
in (16) is increasing in D for D ∈ [0, Dso] and becomes flat for any D > Dso. The global maximum seller
revenue (= 0.30157) is achieved at r = 0.33333 and Dso = 0.5.
2.2 Numerical example 2
Taking N = 2 and vi ∼ U [0, 1], and Φ(pi) = pαi over [0, 1], we have the following two parts for the
computations. First, the optimal Dso and rso are given by









5Note that if no post-auction outside offer exists, i.e., Φ(·) = 0, the optimal reserve price is 0.5.
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(a) D = 0.4 (b) D = 0.33333
(c) D = 0.2
Figure 5: EIs (R) and E
II
s (R) change in r
Figure 6: R∗(D) changes in D
where v̂so = v = 1 and (1 − v̌so)(1 − (v̌so)α) = v̌so − (v̌
so)α+1
α+1 . Then, we can compute the seller’s optimal
revenue with Dso and rso, which is given by
R∗ = 2(1− v̌so)v̌sorso + 2
∫ 1
v̌so
(1− vi)b(vi, rso, Dso)dvi.

























The seller’s revenue with D = 0 and r∗(D = 0), which corresponds to the case of r ≥ D, can be then written
as follows:












We then compute how a change in α affects the sellers’ choices regarding the optimal reserve price rso, the
optimal deposit Dso, and the optimal expected revenue R∗. Figure 7 illustrates how rso and Dso change with
α. Consistent with our theoretical predictions, the figures show that when α increases, which corresponds
to a worse chance for the outside option, both rso and Dso increase.
(a) rso and α (b) Dso and α
Figure 7: The impact of α on rso and Dso
Figure 8 depicts how R∗ changes with α. Again, consistent with the theoretical prediction, an increase
in α generates a higher R∗, which is captured by the black curve. To illustrate the role of a deposit in
the auction with a post-auction outside offer, we compute and plot how seller revenue with D = 0 and the
associated optimal reserve price, denoted by r∗(D = 0), changes with α. As depicted by the red dotted curve,
seller revenue increases in α as well. Interestingly, the difference between the two revenues is not monotonic.
The improvement in seller revenue after charging a deposit is small when the likelihood of having an outside
option, captured by α, is either too small or too large, but a relatively large improvement is achieved when
the likelihood is in the medium range.
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Figure 8: The relationship between R∗ and α
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